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Clogging the Machinery: 
The BBC’s experiment in science coordination, 
1949–1953 
Allan Jones (allan.jones@open.ac.uk) 
 
Abstract 
In 1949, physicist Mark Oliphant criticised the BBC’s handling of science in a letter 
to the Director General William Haley. It initiated a chain of events which led to the 
experimental appointment of a science advisor, Henry Dale, to improve the 
‘coordination’ of science broadcasts. The experiment failed, but the episode revealed 
conflicting views of the BBC’s responsibility toward science held by scientists and 
BBC staff. For the scientists, science had special status, both as knowledge and as an 
activity, which in their view obligated the BBC to make special arrangements for it. 
BBC staff however had their own professional procedures which they were unwilling 
to abandon. 
The events unfolded within a few years of the end of World War 2, when social 
attitudes to science had been coloured by the recent conflict, and when the BBC itself 
was under scrutiny from the William Beveridge’s Committee. The BBC was also 
embarking on new initiatives, notably the revival of adult education. These contextual 
factors bear on the story, which is about the relationship between a public service 
broadcaster and the external constituencies it relies on, but must appear to remain 
independent from. The article therefore extends earlier studies showing how external 
bodies have attempted to manipulate the inner workings of the BBC to their own 
advantage (e.g those by Doctor and Karpf) by looking at the little-researched area of 
science broadcasting. The article is largely based on unpublished archive documents. 
 
Introduction 
The distinguished BBC producer Grace Wyndham Goldie has recounted how, in late 
1945 or early 1946, she began planning a new radio series, The Challenge of Our 
Time. In the aftermath of a convulsive world war, the times called for serious analysis 
– which the series would attempt. She asked a range of British intellectuals what 
issues should be tackled in the series (Goldie 11). To her surprise, instead of the 
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miscellany of proposals she expected, one dominated: ‘the lack of synthesis in modern 
thinking, and in particular the wide gulf between the scientific and the humanistic 
approach to life’(Goldie 12). The Challenge of Our Time was broadcast in spring 
1946, and featured philosophers, scientists, historians, divines and others. Science was 
a recurring theme, with high-profile left-wing scientists J. D. Bernal, J. B. S. Haldane 
and C. H. Waddington speaking of science’s role in creating a rational and fairer 
society, and other speakers – including the chemist Michael Polanyi – taking more 
sceptical line. (Goldie 25–30, 41–50, 56–61). Listening figures were between three 
and five million – high for serious talks – and by popular demand the series was 
published as a book (Goldie 13–14). 
It is not difficult to see why ‘science and society’ touched a nerve at this time. The 
Second World War was widely understood to have been a scientific war, in which 
science had been instrumental in overcoming a foe frequently portrayed as irrational 
and anti-scientific. Yet the closing days of the war had seen the devastating first uses 
of atomic bombs. The problematic standing of science after the war led some ‘public’ 
scientists to temper their former whole hearted advocacy of science. Physiologist 
Henry Dale, for example, who at a scientific conference in 1943 had spoken of 
science’s central place in modern life (Dale Science and the Citizen 285–6), had, by 
1950, adopted a more nuanced view. Now, according to Dale, writing in a BBC 
publication, science must be everyone’s concern because of its potential for 
‘catastrophic misuse’ (Science and Broadcasting 137). Dale plays a major part in the 
events narrated below. 
The above story not only serves as background to this article, which concerns a debate 
about science broadcasting in the UK in late 1940s and early 1950s, but also shows 
how historians of broadcasting might find in science broadcasting a useful window on 
to wider cultural and social issues. For science has in general formed a significant part 
of BBC output – despite scientists’ perpetual complaints about its paucity in 
broadcasting. (An example of scientists’ underestimation of the extent of science 
broadcasting occurs in the following narrative.) 
Although the BBC has not neglected science, historians and commentators on 
broadcasting have. The standard histories by Asa Briggs, Burton Paulu, and Paddy 
Scannell and David Cardiff have, at most, odd sentences or paragraphs alluding to 
science, and no specialist monograph has appeared on the subject. Similarly, the 
considerable body of book-length memoirs published by former BBC staff has 
virtually nothing to say about science.1 Away from the field of media history, 
however, sociological studies of science in all the media have proliferated in recent 
decades, especially in relation to the sociological work done by science popularisation 
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to project not just science, but a particularly favourable view of science and 
scientists.2  
There are, however, a couple of honourable exceptions to the neglect of a historical 
view of science broadcasting. Marcel LaFollette’s two historical studies Science on 
the Air and Science on American Television provide a useful insight into the American 
experience. In the British context, Timothy Boon’s Films of Fact, though mainly 
concerned with cinematic science documentary film, briefly covers some of the 
incidents that are examined at greater length in this article (187–91). Two of my own 
publications on science broadcasting bear somewhat on the present article and are 
cited at appropriate points. 
A letter to the Director General 
In May 1949, William Haley, Director General of the BBC, received a letter from the 
physicist Professor Mark Oliphant. It presented a charge sheet of complaints against 
BBC science broadcasts, and a remedy: 
What I should like to see is some break-away from the perpetual theme of 
‘science and society’, with the inevitable excursion of the scientist into 
fields of politics where he does not shine, towards an attempt to present 
science as natural philosophy, as a way of life and a culture in its own right. 
I believe it can be done. I don’t think scientists should always appear as 
Utopian idealists, as Marxists, or as amateur politicians. Cannot we 
sometimes forget war and atomic weapons, industrial advance or 
productivity, medicine and food production or science and religion, and say 
something more of the history and growth of science, of the great revolution 
wrought by the introduction of the experimental method, of the intellectual 
satisfaction and fun of science, and of the scope and content of modern 
science, all regarded as contributions to knowledge rather than as awe-
inspiring or useful facts?3 
The references to ‘science and society’ broadcasts and to left-wing polemics in 
Oliphant’s letter alluded to broadcasts by politically radical scientists,4 and quite 
possibly to Goldie’s series The Challenge of Our Time. 
Haley took the letter seriously. Oliphant was a respected figure. Australian by birth 
(and shortly to return to Australia), he had lived in the UK since 1927. During the 
war, he had worked on the separation of uranium isotopes as part of the atomic bomb 
projects in the UK and USA. At the time of his letter, Oliphant was a member of the 
BBC’s General Advisory Council, a non-executive body largely comprising eminent 
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figures from public life. The Council had been reconstituted in 1947, following 
wartime abeyance, with a more diverse membership, and now included seven 
scientifically trained members in its complement of 49 (Boon 187). 
An expanded version of Oliphant’s letter was presented to a meeting of the General 
Advisory Council where it was warmly supported by civil servant Sir John Anderson 
and physicist Sir Lawrence Bragg.5 A working group chaired by Anderson and 
informally referred to as the ‘Anderson Committee’ was set up to pursue Oliphant’s 
proposals. It included Oliphant, Bragg, physiologist A. V. Hill, civil servant Sir Alan 
Barlow, and, among the BBC representatives, George Barnes (Director of the Spoken 
Word). 
Oliphant presented a set of suggestions for new types of science programme to a 
meeting of the committee in August 1949. His suggestions came under six headings: 
1 The history, aims and methods of science. 
2 British advancement in science. 
3 A series of discussions between ‘men of distinction’, who could debate 
controversial scientific questions. 
4 A weekly ‘newsletter’ on science directed to scientists and technologists. 
5 A series of programmes on ‘How it works’. 
6 Recent advances in science. 
Under each heading, Oliphant suggested some programme ideas. For example, under 
‘British advancement in science’ came proposals on Newton, Boyle, Faraday, 
Maxwell, Rutherford, and other figures from the physical and biological sciences.6 
This new kind of material, Oliphant judged, would require the appointment of two 
scientists as senior BBC managers to oversee production: one an expert on the 
physical sciences, the other a biology specialist.7 
The same meeting that received Oliphant’s proposals was presented with a list of four 
months’-worth of recent BBC science broadcasts. It came as a revelation. Lawrence 
Bragg was surprised by the extent of current science broadcasting, and pointed out 
that ‘many of the suggestions contained in Professor Oliphant’s memorandum were in 
fact in operation.’8 Indeed, Oliphant’s ‘new’ types of programme were already well 
represented. For example, recent broadcasts on New Calculating Machines (i.e. 
computers), Continuous Creation (with Fred Hoyle), Mesons, Supersonic Planes, and 
many more, fitted Oliphant’s category of ‘recent advances in science’. These 
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broadcasts, furthermore, had been produced without the two senior scientist-managers 
Oliphant deemed essential. 
With the collapse of its raison d’être, the committee might have been expected to 
dissolve itself. Instead it turned its attention in a new direction, unconnected with 
anything Oliphant had proposed: the ‘coordination’ of science broadcasts. The 
outcome was the experimental appointment for two years of Sir Henry Dale as a 
‘science advisor’. However, before looking at this experiment – later characterised by 
BBC staff member Mary Somerville as ‘a somewhat unhappy page in BBC history’9 – 
it is necessary to make a detour into the work of the BBC educationalist Joseph 
Trenaman. 
Joseph Trenaman’s experiments on comprehension 
During 1949, as the Anderson Committee deliberated on science broadcasts, the 
BBC’s Further Education Department conducted experiments into listeners’ 
comprehension of a number of broadcasts, including three on science (Trenaman 
Understanding). The findings of one of these experiments were circulated in October 
1949 in an internal BBC report.10  
The leading light behind this research was Further Education Officer Joseph 
Trenaman. Born on 25 September 1910, he joined the BBC in 1929 as a shorthand 
typist. In 1930 he moved to the weekly BBC publication The Listener, handling its 
advertisements, and remained there until his call-up for wartime military service. 
During the Second World War he trained ‘delinquent’ soldiers, and by the war’s end 
he was teaching on an army education scheme in East Africa. Following the war, now 
fired with enthusiasm for adult education, Trenaman found the prospect of returning 
to his pre-war job unappealing,11 and in December 1945 re-joined the BBC in Listener 
Research. By1949 he was a BBC Further Education Officer – a post he held until 
1959, when he left the BBC to found the Television Research Unit at Leeds 
University. In 1961 he published his most celebrated work, Television and the 
Political Image, co-written with Denis MacQuail. He died in December 1961, but a 
book based on his researches, Communication and Comprehension, appeared 
posthumously in 1967. 12 
The intention behind Trenaman’s research at the time of the Anderson Committee was 
to improve the effectiveness of further educational broadcasts, and, in the case of 
science broadcasts, to shed some light on the efficacy of spoken science 
presentation.13 Further education had been a major plank of pre-war BBC 
broadcasting policy, when it had been strongly oriented towards ‘group listening’. 
This policy, though, was regarded as a failure by the time of the events covered in this 
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article, and an attempt was under way to revive further education through the creation 
of a new department, and through Trenaman’s investigations of listeners’ 
comprehension. Advocacy of this new approach to further education became part of 
the BBC’s evidence in 1949 to the Broadcasting Committee, chaired by William 
Beveridge.14  
In the first of Trenaman’s science-broadcast experiments in 1949, a recording of a 15-
minute talk on electrons was played to 264 listeners of mixed educational 
qualifications gathered in a studio.15 Immediately after the programme, listeners wrote 
down everything they could recollect, and their answers were marked against a list of 
thirty-three ‘teaching points’ distilled from lists of teaching points prepared 
independently by three ‘education officials’ (Trenaman Understanding 174). 
Listeners’ scores were taken to indicate comprehension. 
The results of the experiment were presented in Figure 1. The horizontal axis shows 
categories of listener according to their highest educational attainment. Scores in each 
category were averaged, hence the label on the vertical axis ‘Average group score’. 
The graph line, rising from left to right, shows that students with high educational 
attainments understood the talk better on average than students with low educational 
attainments. A score of 15 was set as the limit of understanding, and groups whose 
average score was below 15 were considered not to have understood the talk. This 
threshold of 15 marks was determined by giving identical sets of 20 marked scripts to 
each of five science teachers. The scripts covered the range of marks from low to 
high, but the marks were hidden. The science teachers were asked sort them into five 
grades, the top being ‘a sufficient understanding of the whole of the talk,’ and the 
bottom ‘little or no understanding of the important points of the talk.’ The middle 
grade, ‘a sufficient understanding of only a few of the important points,’ was taken as 
the threshold, and found to correspond to a mark of 15. In other experiments the 
threshold corresponded to a different mark (Trenaman Understanding 175). 
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Figure 1 Comprehension levels for and educational attainments for  subjects in Trenaman’s 
test of listeners’ understanding of a science broadcast (Source: Listeners’ Understanding of a 
Broadcast Talk on Science, October 1949) 
The surprising result of the experiment, however, was not the findings on 
comprehension, but on interest. Discussions between listeners and experimentalists 
revealed that listeners’ interest in the broadcast was not correlated with their 
comprehension. Three distinct levels of interest were found, broadly associated with 
educational attainment. These interest levels are shown as hatched columns in Figure 
1. The greatest interest (middle column) coincided with subjects whose average score 
was on the limit of understanding – as shown by the intersection of the graph line with 
the score of 15 (the ‘Limit of Understanding’). 
One of the report’s conclusions was that ‘the needs of the general public call for 
spoken word broadcasts in science at three levels of difficulty.’ This finding was the 
most influential part of the report of the experiment. The three levels were felt to 
correspond approximately to the typical educational attainments of audiences for the 
three domestic radio channels of the BBC: the Third Programme, Home Service and 
Light Programme. 
Coordination 
For much of its history, the BBC has had no Science department. Subject-specific 
production departments have generally not existed, except for Music and Religion. At 
the time of the events described here, radio broadcasts on most topics, including 
science, could emerge principally from three departments: 
Talks Department (in Talks Division) 
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Schools Department (in Talks Division) 
Features Department (in Entertainment Division)16 
Members of the Anderson Committee felt that this spread of departmental 
responsibility for science was a dispersal of talent, and led to haphazard 
programming.17 This issue was referred to as a lack of coordination. As this idea was 
being discussed within the Committee, a copy of Trenaman’s report arrived, with its 
suggestion that talks should be planned to fit the ‘three interests’ model. This 
observation fed into the Anderson Committee’s report, which appeared towards the 
end of November 1949. It congratulated the BBC on the ‘impressive volume’ of its 
scientific broadcasting, saying that 7.5% of the time available for Talks was devoted 
to science.18 However, it doubted whether there was adequate coordination of science 
broadcasts to ensure that they had their ‘maximum impact on the interest and 
understanding of listeners at their various levels of knowledge and intelligence’ – a 
reference to Trenaman’s experimental findings.19 The report recommended the 
experimental appointment of a scientific advisor, whose role would be to improve 
coordination, as well as to explore programme ideas, investigate new methods of 
production, and to explore the new potentials offered by television. 
The BBC’s Board of Governors accepted the report’s major recommendation, and set 
about finding a suitable advisor. However, there were dissenters. One manager (name 
unrecorded) did not see lack of coordination as a problem: 
I do not see how, under the present constitution, there could ever be any 
adequate machinery for ensuring complete co-ordination of the 
Corporation’s science output. The best we can hope for is that those who are 
guiding its policy and working out details at least keep in touch with each 
other so that they know what their other colleagues in this field are doing. I 
hope I am not being pessimistic in refusing to be distressed by this thought. 
The range of science today is so vast in relation to the maximum time the 
Corporation can conceivably devote to it that any really comprehensive 
scheme seems impossible.  
This manager considered that a scientific advisor would not help but hinder – in a way 
that gives the present article its title: 
So far as I can see our relations with the scientists are at the moment 
excellent and I can only see such an appointment as is envisaged here as 
clogging the machinery.20 
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The acceptance of the Anderson Committee’s recommendations by BBC Governors is 
ironic. In December 1943, six years before the Anderson Committee’s report, a 
delegation from the British Association for the Advancement of Science had met 
William Haley, then Editor-in-Chief, to argue for the creation of a committee of 
scientists to put forward programme ideas, and for a high level science programme 
officer to, in effect, coordinate science output.21 A couple of months later, in February 
1944, a delegation from the Association of Scientific Workers made almost identical 
proposals. Both sets of proposals received a chilly response from Haley because they 
threatened to interfere with BBC practices and responsibilities. They progressed no 
further.22 I shall return to the striking difference between Haley’s response to the 
1943–4 interventions and Oliphant’s 1949 intervention at the end of this article. 
The Henry Dale experiment and report 
The experimental ‘science adviser’ appointed by the BBC was the physiologist and 
pharmacologist Sir Henry Dale (1875–1968). Dale’s long research career had focused 
on chemical mediators in the human body, and included the discovery of histamine. In 
1914 he became a Fellow of the Royal Society, for which he served as Secretary 
(1925–35) and President (1940–45). He received numerous prizes, including the 
Nobel prize (1907), was honoured with a Knighthood and an Order of Merit, and was 
made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire.23 He was also an occasional 
broadcaster on the BBC. 
Dale’s appointment lasted for two years, from 1 July 1950 to 30 June 1952. Early in 
his appointment, in autumn 1950, he published an article in a BBC publication (Dale 
Science and Broadcasting) in which he stressed the importance of science, both as a 
deliverer of material benefits and as a way of thinking. He stressed the dangers of the 
abuse of knowledge, and the current threats to humanity: annihilation, over-
population, starvation, and exhaustion of raw materials. Science was thus everybody’s 
concern, and broadcasting had a vital role in fostering an enlightened interest in 
science. Dale acknowledged that listeners’ taste for science had limits, but he 
suspected the limits had not been seriously tested, pointing out that in his youth very 
few people had been interested in ‘serious’ music, but the promotion of music at 
popular concerts had created a large audience for it. He suggested something similar 
might be possible with science.  
If Dale had hoped that his appointment would allow him to implement some of these 
ideas, he was to be disappointed. In his report, issued in early 1953, he found that 
working with BBC producers had been highly enjoyable, and was happy to pay tribute 
to them; but his role had been frustrating.24 He had been given no office or secretarial 
support, and had difficulty discovering plans for forthcoming broadcasts. His natural 
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point of contact within the BBC was Archibald Clow, the principal science producer 
in the Talks Department. However Clow was already overloaded with work, and Dale 
could see that his own need for assistance imposed an additional burden on Clow. 
After about a year, help was found for Clow, which freed some of his time. Dale drew 
on it with an easier conscience, but did not regard this a satisfactory solution either for 
Clow or himself. Dale’s lack of facilities was at odds with earlier assurances from 
George Barnes that ‘... the responsible Controllers could be relied upon to give [an 
advisor] adequate scope and effective collaboration.’25 
As far as his coordinating function was concerned, all Dale could do was arrange 
periodic interdepartmental meetings between producers. Each participant was required 
to let Dale know beforehand of current and future projects. The participants said the 
meetings were useful for exchanging information among themselves, but Dale 
reported that no collaboration between producers in different departments followed. 
Producers sought Dale’s opinion on scripts, but always so late in production that very 
little emendation was possible. However, Dale approved of the way television was 
shaping up, and found that he could operate more effectively here than in radio.  
It is hard to see Dale’s report as anything other than an indication of bad faith on the 
BBC’s part. Mary Somerville, Director of Talks at the time of Dale’s report, wrote: 
I cannot but regard the circumstances of [Dale’s] appointment and our 
subsequent treatment of him as a somewhat unhappy page in BBC history. 
In particular, she considered that the Anderson Committee’s recommendation was 
incompatible with BBC practice, and infringed producers’ responsibilities: 
Although the BBC accepted the recommendation of the Anderson 
Committee to appoint a Scientific Adviser I do not think they ever 
subscribed to the assumptions underlying that recommendation i.e. that it is 
desirable in principle to co-ordinate BBC output, or approaches to scientists, 
or that it is necessary for any check to be placed upon producers’ choice of 
speakers by ‘establishing high-level contact with scientists on the requisite 
footing of informality’.26 
Somerville considered that any future Scientific Advisor would have to accept BBC 
practice rather than change it: 
My main recommendation is that if we do appoint another Scientific 
Adviser his terms of reference should be framed to fit the facts of the 
situation inside the BBC. Thus the first question seems to me to be – Is a 
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policy of coordinating programmes and approaches now to be adopted or 
not?27  
No further Scientific Advisor was appointed, and uncoordinated, de-centralised 
production continued as before. The episode, though, had a rhetorical usefulness for 
BBC staff. In a public talk in 1966, Aubrey Singer, Head of Outside Broadcasts, 
Feature and Science Programmes, Television (and originator of the television science 
series Horizon) rather dubiously claimed (Singer 12): 
Previous experience in this field [science broadcasting] had taught us that 
co-ordination ... did not really work and indeed actively discouraged the 
interest of production departments. 
Discussion 
In this section I want to examine and contextualise some of the more striking (and 
strange) features of the story narrated above. 
As has already been mentioned, similar calls on the BBC to coordinate science 
broadcasts were made in 1943–4, and soundly rebuffed. Between 1958 and 1961, 
scientists again (and rather more ill-temperedly) called for science broadcasts to be 
coordinated, and again were rebuffed, although this time the BBC was asked to 
resolve the issue by the Pilkington Committee. A compromise was adopted – the 
establishment of the Science Consultative Group, an advisory committee of scientists 
which had no executive powers (Jones Élite). In all these interventions scientists 
argued for science to be privileged because (as scientists claimed) it was intrinsically 
important in modern life and for the country’s economy. In the scientists’ view, this 
obligated the BBC to elevate science in its output, and to give the scientific world 
greater say in its programming. What is distinctive about the 1949 interventions 
described here, relative to the earlier and later ones, is that they were received 
sympathetically by Director General. Possibly timing had a lot to do with this. The 
1949 interventions happened when the BBC was under scrutiny by the Broadcasting 
Committee chaired by William Beveridge, which took an interest in all aspects of the 
BBC’s work including that of its advisory bodies.28 Haley might therefore have been 
accommodating towards the General Advisory Council for diplomatic reasons. 
However, I suggest a different explanation, which is not incompatible with the one 
just given. The 1949 interventions could be seen as being partly initiated within the 
BBC, in the sense that external members sat on the General Advisory Council by 
invitation from the BBC.29 In 1943–4 and 1958–61, by contrast, the initiatives came 
from bodies outside the BBC, principally from the British Association for the 
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Advancement of Science and the Royal Society, and could be construed as 
institutional threats to the BBC’s autonomy.  
The story told here shows that Oliphant and the other members of the General 
Advisory Council, and later the Anderson Committee, had a superficial, and even 
prejudiced, view of the nature of the BBC’s science broadcasts. They erroneously 
considered the broadcasts to be dominated by instrumental, and politically motivated, 
portrayals of science, and argued for a view of science as culture, and deserving 
consideration alongside other cultural practices. The historian Roy Porter has 
commented on a post-war propensity among scientists to prefer a ‘cultural’ framing of 
science: ‘In the post-Hiroshima twilight when science had lost its innocence, this 
[cultural interpretation of science] could be comforting news’ (36). Much of 
Oliphant’s war-time work had been connected with the development of atomic 
weapons, and much of his post-war career with peaceful uses of nuclear power, so his 
intervention has the hallmarks of the phenomenon identified by Porter.  
Joe Trenaman’s experimental results were seized on both by scientists and BBC staff 
members, and it is worth exploring the extent to which Trenaman’s methods and 
results played to the presuppositions of each group. Trenaman’s approach had the 
appearance and trappings of science. It assumed that comprehension was quantifiable, 
and that laboratory-like conditions enabled it to be isolated and measured. In his book 
Communication and Comprehension, Trenaman almost fetishised his experimental 
procedure, as though to establish its scientific merit (14–15): 
For the sound broadcasts the studio seating was arranged so that each 
member was usually sitting about two feet from his neighbour. The viewing 
theatres, where the television versions were seen, were smaller, with tip-up 
seats in fixed positions, and it was not possible to separate participants to 
the same extent.  
Each respondent was asked to complete three lots of questionnaires stapled 
in three separate booklets of contrasting colours. 
During the playback of the recordings the lights were dimmed for the sound 
broadcasts and were switched right off for the telerecordings in the hope 
that members would be less conscious of the presence of the others in the 
group. They were asked to try to imagine that they were at home. 
This ‘scientific’ approach could be expected to have appealed to scientists, and it is 
telling that scientific members of the Anderson Committee were ‘interested and 
impressed’ by the results of Trenaman’s experiment.30  
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For the broadcasters, Trenaman’s conclusion that listeners could be aggregated into 
three groups on the basis of their academic qualifications provided a ‘scientific’ 
rationale for what was already a standard way of stratifying audiences. In 1938, for 
example, a senior talks assistant wrote in a memorandum that listeners fell into 
categories: A, B and C. Group A were the ‘intelligent and well informed’. Group B 
were ‘intelligent and not so well informed.’ Group C, the largest, included the ‘not so 
intelligent and mostly uninformed’ who, because of their ‘extreme simplicity’ would 
only listen to ‘adventure’ or ‘personality’ talks’.31 In 1943, Mary Somerville also split 
listeners into three groups: 
1 Well informed people who would be interested to hear of new research 
work [...] 
2 Less well educated people who already have the capacity for taking an 
interest in some science ... without having the training to satisfy their own 
interest. 
3 The uninformed and uneducated man (and woman) in the street who are 
to be found in all classes of the community and who retard social progress 
in all departments of life when co-operation depends on the acceptance of 
scientific principles.32 
And Haley himself thought of the public as a three-layer pyramid for which ‘... we 
would have a Light Programme which would cover the lower third of the pyramid. 
We would have a Home Service which would take more than the middle third, take 
everything up to the tip. And then we’d have a Third Programme. [...]’ 33 However, 
Robert Silvey, a long-term member of BBC staff who pioneered audience research, 
had a less crude view of audience stratification, for which just as much empirical 
justification could be claimed as for Trenaman’s view. According to Silvey (124–5), 
‘highbrow’ listeners were distinguished from others by the fact that they listened to, 
and appreciated, all kinds of material, not simply the kind their educational and 
cultural backgrounds were thought to predispose them to. 
Following the Anderson Committee’s ‘discovery’ that science broadcasts were not as 
Oliphant had claimed, but were already in the style of his ‘new’ type of broadcast, it is 
striking how the Committee’s concerns swung round to ‘coordination’, drawing on 
the timely appearance of Trenaman’s experimental findings. In the mid-to-late 1940s, 
coordination of output had been a subject of considerable debate and policy shifts 
within the BBC. In 1945, with a new Third Programme still at the planning stage, a 
policy of decentralised programme planning was introduced by Haley. The three radio 
networks were expected to compete with each other, so far as this was possible 
  14 
without compromising their essential characters (Briggs Sound 69–74). This policy 
brought benefits, but by 1948 was judged too problematic to be allowed to continue. It 
was rescinded by Haley, who announced that ‘constructive and creative planning’ was 
to take the place of competition within and between radio services. The services were 
to be ‘co-ordinated to the fullest possible extent in the listeners’ general interest.’34 
The Anderson Committee’s interest in ‘coordination’ was therefore consonant with 
the recent policy shift towards coordinated production. However, for broadcasters and 
scientists ‘coordination’ turned out to mean different things. As Briggs explains, for 
the broadcasters coordination was related to the efficient use of resources in pursuit of 
the BBC’s cultural mission (Sound 74). For the scientists, coordination meant the 
efficient use of resources (under the management of a scientist) for the promotion of 
science. It represented a transfer of responsibility away from BBC staff and towards 
scientists, and directly challenged the professional competence of production staff. 
This is not to say that Henry Dale actually aspired to controlling science broadcasts 
during his experimental appointment; but there was potential for BBC production 
staff to lose autonomy, and for managerial lines of responsibility to become confused, 
if the experiment resulted in a permanent post. Against this background, it is no 
surprise that the experiment was ‘a somewhat unhappy page in BBC history’.  
Conclusion 
Earlier in this article I mentioned the comparative neglect of science in historical 
studies of broadcasting. This article suggests that a potentially productive way to 
approach the topic is via the relationship between the BBC and the world of ‘élite 
science’ (such as the Royal Society and other influential, high prestige bodies). Within 
both of these domains there was a somewhat paternalistic orientation towards the 
public. That is, in both there was a tendency to see the public as needing guidance 
towards what was beneficial. For the scientists, this meant promoting a particular 
view of science and its importance to the public, and the transfer to scientists of a 
greater degree of control over science broadcasting. For the BBC it meant promoting 
knowledge of a wide range of cultural activities, including science, and the retention 
of control by the BBC as the guardians of public service broadcasting. In both cases 
we see a concern with remoulding public tastes on a large scale, which naturally opens 
possibilities for both cooperation and conflict. In the present case, the cooperation 
between the BBC and its advisors led to conflict when the possibility of external 
control and disruption to existing BBC practices became apparent to BBC staff.  
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Notes 
In the following notes, WAC indicates the BBC Written Archives Centre at 
Caversham, Reading, UK. 
1  Bridson (319) pays compliment to BBC radio science producers Archie Clow, David Edge 
and Mick Rhodes. Lambert (75) speaks highly of the work of 1930s science producer Mary Adams. 
Other memoirs by Eckersley (Power), Eckersley (BBC), Gorham, Grisewood, Hibberd, Maine, Reith, 
and Silvey say nothing about science broadcasting. 
2  See for example, Gregory and Miller, and Sismondo. 
3  WAC R6/34, letter from Mark Oliphant to W. J. Haley, 16 May 1949.   
4  For more on broadcasts in the 1930s by left wing scientists, see Jones (Mary Adams). 
5  WAC R6/34, minutes of General Advisory Council meeting, 2 June 1949. 
6  WAC R6/34 undated Memorandum ‘A Suggested Series of Programs [sic] on Science’ by M. 
L. E. Oliphant. 
7  WAC R6/34 undated Memorandum ‘A Suggested Series of Programs [sic] on Science’ by M. 
L. E. Oliphant. 
8 WAC R6/34 Minutes of Anderson Committee meeting, 16 August 1949. 
9  WAC R6/186, Memo 26th January 1953 from Controller talks (Home Sound) [Mary 
Somerville] to DSW [Director of Spoken word, Harman Grisewood]. 
10  WAC R6/34, report Listeners’ Understanding of a Broadcast Talk on Science, October 1949. 
11  WAC L1/901/1 Internal BBC memo, 2 January 1945, Record of Interview with J. Trenaman. 
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12  Most of this biographical information about Trenaman is from WAC L1/901/1, Trenaman’s 
BBC personnel file, supplemented with information from his obituary in The Times (9 January 1962, 
p.13) and from the foreword to Trenaman (Communication). 
13 WAC R6/34, report Listeners’ Understanding of a Broadcast Talk on Science, October 1949, 
p.2. 
14  WAC R15/152, G41.52 ‘Further Education Policy’, 15 May 1952. 
15  The talk was by the physicist Nevill Mott, and entitled ‘What are we Doing with Electrons?’, 
broadcast on Tuesday 19 July 1949 at 21.15 (reprinted in The Listener, 28 July 1949, pp. 153–4). The 
figure of 264 listeners comes from WAC R99/6/1, J. Trenaman, Understanding of Broadcasts on 
Science, paper read to the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (Section 
J), 5 September 1950. 
16  WAC R6/34, George Barnes, memo to Special subcommittee to consider Broadcasts on 
Science, 4 July 1949 
17  WAC R6/34, Special subcommittee to consider Broadcasts on Science, Minutes of a meeting 
on 16 August 1949. 
18  WAC GAC148 Report of the Special Sub-committee to consider broadcasts in science, 23 
November 1949. 
19 WAC GAC148 Report of the Special Sub-committee to consider broadcasts in science, 23 
November 1949, p. 1. 
20  WAC R6/34, memo 19 Dec 1949 to CHS [Controller Home Service, R. E. L. Wellington] 
from unnamed. 
21  WAC R51/529 Notes of meeting at Broadcasting House, 14 December 1943. 
22 WAC R51/529, memo 24 November 1943. 
23  Biographical information from Feldberg 2004. 
24 WAC R6/186 Report to the BBC Governors by Sir Henry Dale, 13 January 1953. 
25  WAC R6/34, minutes of a meeting on 17 October 1949. 
26 WAC R6/186, memo from Mary Somerville to Director of Spoken Word, 26th January 1953. 
27 WAC R6/186, memo from Mary Somerville to Director of Spoken Word, 26th January 1953. 
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28  Briggs (Sound 298); Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1949, recommendation 55 (p. 
196) recommended that the BBC increase the number of its advisory councils. 
29  In the context of advisory councils and committees, Paulu (Television 140) writes of the 
National Councils for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, for which members are selected ‘not 
directly by the BBC, as are all other council and committee members....’ 
30  WAC R6/34 Minutes of a meeting on 7 November 1949. 
31  Quoted by Cardiff (35).  
32  WAC R51/523/3, memo from Mary Somerville to Director of Talks 3 March 1942. 
33  BBC Oral History P, Sir William Haley interviewed by Frank Gillard, quoted by Carpenter 
(9). 
34  Haley, ‘Home Programme Policy’ 15 March 1948, quoted by Briggs (Sound 74). 
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